The Act East Policy by India, which was introduced in November 2014 as an extension of the previous Look East Policy, was destined to be a revolutionary roadmap of economic integration between India, Southeast Asia and other areas. Theoretically, it was to stimulate vigorous trade development, enhance the regional connection, and capitalize on the strategic positioning of India, more so the northeastern states, to penetrate the expanding markets of the ASEAN countries. Rather, a decade plus into its application, the facts on the ground demonstrates a trend of poor performance, exaggerated reports, and missed economic prospects, in part because of poor implementation, and political considerations that have overlooked long-term regional development—an issue also reflected in critiques of India’s broader foreign policy approach such as India’s declining regional influence and diplomatic challenges:
Act East: Vision vs. Reality
The current Narendra Modi government had been selling the Act East Policy as a radical policy rethink-abandoning symbolic diplomacy, in favour of active involvement with the South East Asian nations. It offered infrastructure, trade routes, and improved business that will favor the northeastern states of India as the ASEAN market access points. But when economic results are the real measure, the claims of this government are a sham.
Trade between India and ASEAN states increased during the past administrations since the Look East era, i.e., between USD 2 billion in 1992 and USD 72 billion in 2017-18. But in the modern Act East arrangement, the Northeast represents a tiny 5 percent of the trade with ASEAN in spite of geographic closeness-another neglect of potential and obvious indication of stagnation in policy.
Northeast India’s Economy: Still on the Fringes
The story about how “Act East” is propelling economic success in the Northeast of India does not usually tally with the economic statistics:
The role of northeast India as an economic gateway to the south east is not reflected in the amount of trade with the south east. India has very little of its trade with ASEAN going through these states and has local producers, farmers and industries that are not linked with larger supply chains.
The infrastructure is still spotty. Most of the trade routes like the India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway which had been envisioned to allow India to have a direct access to the markets in ASEAN have been constantly sidelined by war in Myanmar and poor diplomatic efforts—issues that tie into wider geopolitical vulnerabilities discussed in how external conflicts impact India’s economic stability.
The internal transport of Myanmar has also been hindered by the infrastructure issues of the country itself as there are only 15 percent of paved roads in Myanmar, and India has to use expensive sea transport. This has led to 92 percent of licit trade between Myanmar and other countries by sea and only 8 percent by air despite the country being long-bordered.
Bangladesh: Missed Opportunities and Trade Imbalances
Although the Bangladesh overall Look East orientation has spurred growth, the policy of India has failed to provide similar access. In 2025, India banned some export routes via land ports by citing it as a justification of parity on trade relationships with Bangladesh. Analysts said, though, that these tariffs and restrictions are merely the responses of economic policy, as opposed to an active trade program that will have enhanced the integration of the markets of the region.
This kind of reactive trade management is an indication of lack of coherent strategy. In case trade is actually given a high priority, India would not only cut down its non tariff barriers, but also facilitate a smooth passage of its goods between the Northeast and Bangladesh markets, in particular, in sectors such as tea, spices, bamboo products, and handicrafts, which have potential in exporting.
Connectivity Projects: Underperforming Political Buzzwords
Most flagship connectivity projects publicized within the Act East policy such as railway networks between Agartala-Akhaura, Bangladesh and inland waterways using the Brahmaputra have experienced delays, cost increases, or have not been finished. The real growth in freight movement and trade has been small with the road transport continuing to dominate despite the constant announcements, because of its relative efficiency.
The fact that India has continued to, in its grand narratives, stress on strategic partnerships, tends to drown out the absence of any economic results. The funds that might have been channeled to real competitive logistic centers are wasted on empty gestures and diplomatic conferences, which though headlining, do very little to change the economic situations of the Northeast.
Comparative Underperformance
China presents a stark contrast. In spite of the Indian focus on balancing Chinese influence, China is engaging in trade and infrastructure activities in ASEAN at a higher rate compared to India.
The extensive free trade deals, big port and rail projects, and extensive integration in to regional value chains in Beijing have brought much more economic power to the capital city and Delhi has never matched with the power in decades of diplomatic talk.
Economic Growth vs. Political Posturing
The opponents claim that the Modi government has used the Act East Policy more as a political weapon in its attempt to enhance the geopolitical location of India against China, as opposed to a real, economic development policy that empowers the Northeast. Such emphasis on strategic optics has ensured that local economies are keepers of sides in the regional trade, whereas the political capital is evaluated at international levels..
Conclusion
The effects of the Act East Policy on trade with Myanmar, Bangladesh and Southeast Asia are dismal when judged solely on economic terms. Even as the northeastern states continue to be sidelined by the very economic girdle they are to anchor with, grand announcements and diplomatic rhetoric notwithstanding. The Act East Policy could still be nothing but a political slogan unless there is a real political enthusiasm to realize it, unless there is clear implementation and a move away of geopolitical showmanship to a grassroots economic integration to transform Northeast India.
